Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2003 Proceedings

Americas Conference on Information Systems
(AMCIS)

December 2003

Flexibility and Cost in Information Technology
Outsourcing: Balancing Opposing Goals
Param Singh
Texas Tech University

Eric Walden
Texas Tech University

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003
Recommended Citation
Singh, Param and Walden, Eric, "Flexibility and Cost in Information Technology Outsourcing: Balancing Opposing Goals" (2003).
AMCIS 2003 Proceedings. 210.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2003/210

This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2003 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

FLEXIBILITY AND COST IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
OUTSOURCING: BALANCING OPPOSING GOALS
Param V. Singh
Jerry Rawls College of Business
Texas Tech University
psingh@ttacs.ttu.edu

Eric A. Walden
Jerry Rawls College of Business
Texas Tech University
ewalden@battu.edu
Abstract

The growth in the importance of IT outsourcing arrangements combined with the rate of failure of such
arrangements makes it imperative to address issues of contracting in the IS literature. In this work, we examine
the contract directly and show how the costs stipulated in the contract affect the nature of the outsourcing
relationship. The work develops a mathematical model of IT outsourcing contracts to explore the relationship
between costs of the anticipated IT needs and the costs of additional resources in the face of changing IT needs.
The model exposes the underlying tension between the baseline cost of an anticipated bundle of services and
the flexibility to modify that bundle in response to changing environmental conditions. Additionally, we draw
testable propositions about the relationship between contractually specified costs of IT services and the costs
inherent in both client and vendor production of IT services. The model shows that client can never get the
same cost structure as the vendor. Rather the client achieves contractually specified cost structure that will be
a compromise between vendor and client costs. The model also proposes that contractual flexibility is directly
related to the contractually specified cost of the anticipated bundle of IT services. Thus, contracts that stipulate
a very low baseline cost for the anticipated bundle of IT services are less flexible so that changes beyond the
baseline are more expensive.
Keywords: Contracts, outsourcing, economic models, flexibility, base cost

Introduction
Information technology (IT) outsourcing is one of the most significant management practices to arise in the past century. Industry
observers have gone so far as to suggest that the ability to outsource is the primary driver of IT productivity (Kirkpatrick, 2002).
In the United States alone, IT outsourcing accounted for more than $100 billion in revenue in 2000, and is expected to grow to
$160 billion by 2005 (Vijayan, 2002). Progressively larger contracts are being inked everyday, so that “outsourcing arrangements
once considered large are being dwarfed by recent deals (Gurbaxani, 1996).” Firms have now started considering IT outsourcing
as a strategic activity. Firms that earlier outsourced only minor information system (IS) services, are now outsourcing entire IS
departments (Mazzawi, 2002).
Though firms spend considerable time and effort in drafting IT outsourcing agreements—the average contract takes 15-18 months
to prepare—contracts still fail with alarming regularity (Barthelemy, 2001). The majority of outsourcing arrangements have to
be renegotiated and one in eight is prematurely terminated as expensive failure (Caldwell, 1997; Lacity and Willcocks, 2001).
Why do these arrangements, which showed every sign of success initially, fail with such disturbing regularity? One of the most
frequently cited reasons is a lack of flexibility (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Clients often believe that the benefits from the
arrangements are eaten away by the additional costs they did not anticipate early in the contract (Barthelemy, 2001).
This work develops a mathematical model of IT outsourcing contracts to explore the relationship between costs of the anticipated
IT needs and the costs of additional resources in the face of changing IT needs. Additionally we draw, testable propositions about
the nature of IT outsourcing contracts and their relationship to vendor and client capabilities. The model shows that client’s focus
on baseline cost savings necessarily results in decreased flexibility. The model also clarifies the fact that an outsourcing
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relationship does not simply replace the client’s capabilities with the vendor’s superior capabilities. Rather, IT outsourcing
replaces the client’s capabilities with contractually specified capabilities that will be a compromise between vendor and client
capabilities. Hence, the model offers a reasonable explanation of the stylized facts of IT outsourcing contracts and the problems
inherent in them.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we review the literature on contracting for IT outsourcing. Following that,
we develop a model of IT outsourcing based on contracts. We then derive the propositions of this model and conclude with a
discussion of the model and directions for future research.

Literature Review
Prior economic based research into outsourcing arrangements has focused on problems of observability and structuring
arrangements to overcome such problems. Most of the research has been directed towards the vendor selection under uncertain
vendor quality and inability to verify vendor performance or divergent interests of contracting parties (Chaudhary, et al., 1995;
Snir and Hitt, 2001; Whang, 1992).
The prior literature described above is based on an incomplete contract paradigm, which essentially discusses business
arrangements that allow firms to compensate for issues that can not be directly addressed in contracts. However, we take a slightly
different approach, based on Tirole’s suggestions that, “…standard complete contracting tools may have been too hastily
dismissed… (Tirole, 1999 p. 744)” and Lacity and Willcocks observation that “…detailed contracts are a critical success factor
to successful deals (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001 p. xiii).” We examine the contract directly and study how the costs stipulated
in the contract determine the nature of the outsourcing relationship.
Prior literature identifies various drivers of IT outsourcing value. Most important economic drivers of IT outsourcing value are
cost and flexibility. While cost reduction is clearly high on most clients’ priorities, practitioners and academicians have stressed
on the importance of flexibility in a contract (Berg, 1999; Goolsby, 2002; Harris, et al., 1998; Hoffman, 1996; Lacity, et al., 1995;
Lang, 1999; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; McGee, 1998). Some go so far as to suggest that the most important characteristic of
a successful relationship is flexibility (Goolsby, 2002), while others provide a framework to maximize flexibility (Lacity, et al.,
1995). However, to the authors’ knowledge, no one has worked on the interplay of baseline cost and flexibility.

Model
While there are many factors salient to a good outsourcing arrangement, economic considerations are among the most important
reasons for outsourcing (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; Smith, et al., 1998). There are generally two
types of costs involved in an IT outsourcing contract—baseline cost and additional resource charges (ARCs). Baseline cost takes
into account the IS requirements that the client expects to face. The baseline cost often includes a whole bundle of services.
However, in a fluid environment, like that of IT, unforeseen eventualities arise that require additional resources beyond those
originally expected, and hence the need for ARC. For example, a firm that inked a 10-year outsourcing agreement in 1993, would
obviously have had very different and unexpected needs when it deployed an internet storefront in 1999. ARC determines the
flexibility of the contract. Following prior literature, we assume that an increase in flexibility reduces the slope of the marginal
cost curve and hence the ARC (Hiebert, 1989). In this work, we show that there is a fundamental tension between baseline cost
and flexibility.
We develop a two period model to analyze the tension between baseline cost and flexibility. In order to keep the model simple,
we characterize IT outsourcing services as being described only by a quantity of services, which is a random variable. We then
examine baseline cost and flexibility relative to traditional average cost curves. Baseline cost is the average cost at the expected
quantity of services. Flexibility is defined as the inverse of the slope of the marginal cost curve as shown in Table 1. This
definition is not immediately intuitive and bears some discussion.
Conceptually, flexibility is the ability of a firm to react to a changing environment. This work limits the environment to one
variable—quantity. This means that flexibility is the ability to react to changes in the desired quantity of IT outsourcing services.
However, reacting does not simply mean that it is possible to change quantity; rather, it means that it is possible to change quantity
cheaply. Thus, one firm is more flexible than another if changing its quantity of IT outsourcing services by a given amount results
in a lesser increase in marginal cost than the other firm. These ideas are illustrated in Figure 1.
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2003 — Ninth Americas Conference on Information Systems

Singh & Walden/Flexibility & Cost in IT Outsourcing

Marginal Cost

MC(3)

BaseLine
Quantity

MC(2)
MC(1)

Quantity

Figure 1. Hypothetical Marginal Cost Curves
The figure illustrates three hypothetical marginal cost curves. Baseline cost is the cost given by the labeled line at the baseline
quantity. Flexibility is the inverse of the slope of the marginal cost curve at any given point. The curve labeled MC(1) is the most
flexible because it has the smallest slope. This means that changes in the quantity of IT services can be accommodated with only
small increases in the marginal cost of producing those services. It is important to note that baseline cost and flexibility are
independent concepts. For example, while MC(1) is more flexible than MC(2), MC(2) has a lower baseline cost. Conversely,
MC(1) is both more flexible and has lower baseline cost than MC(3).

Assumptions
Consider a two period game with two risk neutral firms—a client and a vendor. The firms wish to formalize an agreement in
which the vendor supplies IT services to the client. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one type of service being
supplied, which can only vary in quantity. The quantity is a random variable, q, which defines how much service the vendor
supplies to the client. Both parties know the distribution of quantity, f(q), in period one, but do not realize the actual level of
quantity until period two. Clearly, in a real outsourcing arrangement, quantity would be a vector of various services, but the model
is not significantly enhanced by considering multiple services.
In period one, the client and the vendor negotiate a contract, which specifies a function mapping all possible levels of quantity
into prices. We implicitly assume that contracts are binding, negotiation is free, and that both firms have full information. Thus,
in period one the parties are able to negotiate a contract free of any transaction costs that might arise in period two, when the firms
are in a bilateral dependency relationship (Williamson, 1985). In other words, we recognize the transaction cost problem brought
on by bilateral dependency in the second period, but by allowing free negotiation of binding contracts in the first period, firms
can create the arrangement in period two that would be obtained if there were no transactions costs. Thus, we are allowing for
complete, Arrow-Debreu type contracts (Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Masten, 2000).
In period two, the actual required quantity of outsourcing services is realized and the price is determined based on the contract.
In the first period, the quantity is not known, but the distribution of the quantity is fully known to parties. Note also that there
is no room for renegotiation of the contract. The time frame of the model is illustrated in Figure 2.
IT services can be produced at cost Cc(q) by the client and Cv(q) by the vendor. Assume that the vendor has expertise in IT
services and can accomplish the same tasks at a lower cost than the client. Owing to its experience, the vendor has a better costcontrol for the changes in quantity over time than the client. The vendor can provide a better level of service at a lower cost than
the internal IS department because of economies of scale, tighter control over fringe benefits, better access to lower cost labor
pools, and more focused expertise in managing IS (Smith, et al., 1998). Thus, we make the assumption that the vendor is both
more flexible and less costly than the client. This means that the vendor’s marginal cost curve has a lower value and a lower slope
at every possible level of quantity. These assumptions are detailed in Table 1.
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Period One

Period Two

Firms negotia te a
contrac t specifying price
for every possible level
of quanti ty in period two

Quanti ty is realized.
The vendor su pplies the
quanti ty and the client
pays the price
negotiated in period one

Time

Figure 2. Time Frame of Model
Outsourcing will generate a surplus, S = Cc(q) - Cv(q). The contract will be a mechanism by which to divide this surplus between
the client and vendor. The contract will specify a price, P(q), for each level of q. Expected values of the contract to the client
and the vendor have been defined as the share of surplus received by accepting the contract. The contract will provide an expected
value to the client equal to

E (π c ) =

∫ (C

c

( q ) − P (q ) ) f ( q ) dq

(1)

q

The expected value of the contract to the vendor is

E (π v ) =

∫ (P ( q ) − C

v

( q ) ) f ( q ) dq

(2)

q

Specification of Price and Quantity
In order to solve the general form of the model and develop propositions requires additional assumptions. For tractability, we
will assume that costs and contractually specified prices are linear. This allows us to have a reasonable approximation to reality
and enables us to solve the model. It is a reasonable approximation to reality because outsourcing contracts frequently stipulate
some baseline quantity of services for a fixed price, plus a variable cost to cover additional service requirements. Thus, a contract
specifies a baseline price, bp, for the target quantity of IT services, plus an ARC, mp, which determines variable costs.
The other assumption that must be made is the distribution of q. There is no real á prior choice for the distribution of quantity
that we can rely upon. Two common choices would be a normal or a uniform distribution. The normal distribution is
computationally complex and relies upon two parameters. The uniform distribution is much simpler analytically. Because the
focus of this work is on the negotiation of price rather than the underlying distributions we assume an uniform distribution for
q. These assumptions are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Assumptions
Assumption
#1

C v (q ) < C c ( q )

#2

1
1
>
 dC v ( q )   dC c ( q ) 
dC v ( q ) dC c ( q )

 

<
dq
dq
dq
dq
 

⇒ 

#3

C v ( q ) = bv + m v q vendor cost

The cost to produce the services and the
contractually specifies price are linear functions of
quantity. The baseline quantity is normalized to zero
so the baseline cost is the intercept.

C c ( q ) = bc + m c q client cost
P ( q ) = b p + m p q contract price
#4

#5

The possible range of quantity is uniformly
distributed.

1 0 ≤ q ≤ 1
f (q) = 
0 otherwise

flex i =

Comments
Vendor has absolute cost advantage over the client at
all levels of quantity.
The slope of the vendor’s marginal cost curve is less
than the slope of the client’s. This implies that the
vendor has greater flexibility than the client.

Flexibility is defined as the inverse of the slope of
the marginal cost curve. Thus, a steeper curve
implies less flexibility.

1
 dC i ( q ) 


 dq 

i ∈ {c, v, p} ≡ {client , vendor , contract }
Generating the Constraint - Base Case (50-50 Split)
As we noted above, free negotiation in the first period circumvents transaction costs in the second period. This means that one
possible contract negotiated in the first period will be equivalent to what would be obtained by free negotiation in the second
period. By equivalent, we mean that both parties must be at least as well off with the final contract as they would be with a
contract that stipulates the second period free negotiation outcome. Thus, it is necessary to define what the second period, free
negotiation outcome would be.
The Nash bargaining solution for dividing surplus between two parties with equal negotiating abilities is to split the surplus in
half (Bakos and Nault, 1997; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Such practices of 50-50 surplus split are common (Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine, 1995; Chao, 1983). Thus, one viable contract is the contract which awards ½ of the surplus to each firm at each level
of q. To establish a base case we first define a contract that divides the surplus in half for all possible realizations of q.
Given this sharing rule, the price function is

~
P ( q ) = C v ( q ) + ½ (C c ( q ) − C v ( q ))

(3)

The hat “~” indicates the solution to the 50-50 split base case. It can be shown that this is

~
~
 b + bc   m v + m c 
~ q
P (q) =  v
q = b p + m
+
p
2

 2  

(4)

Applying the assumed distribution of q, this entails an expected value of the contract of
1
 b − bv
E (π~c ) = E (π~v ) = ∫  c
2
0 

  mc − mv
+
2
 

 
 q  qdq
 

(5)

for both the client and the vendor.
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General Case
The 50-50 split case represents only one of an infinite number of possible contracts. Given that the 50-50 split case is solved,
it is now possible to solve for the other contracts. Because the 50-50 split case contract is possible, neither party would be willing
to agree to a contract that offered less expected value than the possible contract. Thus, the other contracts must be subject to the
constraints

E (π c ) ≥ E (π~c )

(6)

E (π v ) ≥ E (π~v )

(7)

 b

3b
1
1
m p = 3 − p + (bv + bc ) + (mc + m v ) = − p + k
6
2
 2 4


(8)

for the client, and

for the vendor.
Applying these constraints to (2) yields the solution

Here, k is a constant whose value depends upon mv, bv, mc, bc. For a proof see appendix.

Propositions of Model
Before developing propositions, it is necessary to note our measure of flexibility. Applying the definition in assumption #5, the
flexibility can be defined as

flex c =

1
1
=
 dC c ( q )  mc


 dq 

(9)

1
1
=
 dC v ( q )  mv


 dq 

(10)

1
1
=
 dP ( q )  m p


 dq 

(11)

for the client,

flex v =

for the vendor, and

flex p =

for the contract.
The first implication of the solution presented in (8) is the relationship between contractual flexibility and base cost. This can
be seen from the derivative
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∂m p
∂b p

<0

This implies that baseline cost and flexibility are positively related. Increasing flexibility requires an increase in baseline cost,
while reduced baseline cost leads to decreased flexibility. This is expressed in proposition one.
Proposition 1:

If the client demands a lower baseline price, then it will lose flexibility as ARC increase.

This is a profound implication of the model, because it means that two of the fundamental goals of outsourcing—flexibility and
cost—are diametrically opposed.
The model also provides for additional implications. The traditional logic for outsourcing suggests that the client outsources to
take advantage of the greater capabilities of the vendor. However, the model shows that the client cannot take full advantage of
the vendor’s capabilities even in the equal division of surplus. Flexibility in the case of base case contract is given by

~
f lex p =

~
2
~
f lex p 1
and m c > m v , this implies
<
, so that f lex p < flex v .
mv + mc
mv

~

~
Proposition 2: Even if the client accepts the base case (i.e. contract with intercept b p and slope m p ), it does not get
the same flexibility as that of the vendor.
A similar result holds for baseline costs.

~
b + bv
~
and bc > bv this implies b p > bv
bp = c
2
Proposition 3:

~

~
Even if the client accepts the baseline case (i.e. contract with intercept b p and slope m p ), it does
not get the same baseline price as that of the vendor.

These propositions highlight the important point that while outsourcing may provide the client with additional capabilities, it does
not give the client the capabilities of the vendor. In other words, the client will never be able to perform IT functions at the same
level as the vendor, even when IT service is outsourced to the vendor. Rather the client’s capabilities are fully determined by the
contract. This raises the question of how the underlying capabilities of client and vendor determine the contract.
More flexible vendors are able to control costs more efficiently for unpredicted changes in requirements. So providing additional
units of quantity does not cost the vendor too much. Therefore, the outsourcing arrangements involving more flexible vendors
have low ARC, leading to high flexibility. The model shows

∂m p
∂mv

=

∂flex p
1
⇒
>0
2
∂flexv

this implies proposition four.
Proposition 4:

Ceteris paribus the flexibility of contract will be positively related to the flexibility of the vendor.

It is also interesting to consider the impact of client flexibility on the contract. As the model shows

∂m p
∂mc

=

∂flex p
1
⇒
>0
2
∂flexc

this implies proposition five.
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Proposition 5:

Ceteris paribus the flexibility of contract will be positively related to the flexibility of the client.

In addition to vendor and client flexibility, the model suggests that contractual flexibility is influenced by both vendor and client
baseline costs. The vendor with a lower baseline cost will be able to offer a comparatively more flexible contract for a given
contractual baseline cost. The model shows

∂m p
∂bv

=

∂flex p
3
⇒
<0
4
∂bv

this implies proposition six.
Proposition 6:

Ceteris paribus the flexibility of contract will be negatively related to the baseline cost of the vendor.

A similar result holds for the client. The model shows

∂m p
∂bc

=

∂flex p
3
⇒
<0
4
∂bc

this implies proposition seven.
Proposition 7:

Ceteris paribus the flexibility of contract will be negatively related to the baseline cost of the client.

Discussion
This work analyzed the relationships among flexibility and baseline cost of production of IT services by vendors, clients, and the
contractually specified joining of the two. Our main results are:
•
•
•
•

Lower baseline cost leads to decreased flexibility in a contract.
The contractually governed outsourcing arrangement does not allow the client the same level of capability as that of the
vendor.
The flexibilities of the client and the vendor are positively related to the flexibility of the contract.
The baseline costs of the client and the vendor are negatively related to the flexibility of the contract.

The first point is especially relevant because of the client’s reasons for outsourcing. Concerned about the current financial needs
of the firm, the client seeks a contract involving lowest baseline cost not considering the effect of high ARC or low flexibility.
However, as IT invariably changes quickly, flexibility is required. So initially, what looked like a good deal ends up being a very
costly problem. The parties then either have to live with the problem or renegotiate the contract or terminate the arrangement;
none of which is a particularly appealing prospect.
With the increase in money involved in IT outsourcing arrangements and in the rate of failure of such arrangements, it becomes
very important that more attention is paid to issues that can be directly addressed in the contract. In this work, we examine the
contract directly and show how the costs stipulated in the contract affect the nature of the outsourcing relationship. We develop
an economic model that exposes the tension between baseline cost and flexibility of the contract. Due to financial constraints
involved, it is very important for the client to strike a balance between baseline cost and flexibility. We show that outsourcing
arrangement involving cheapest baseline cost is not always the most flexible and, hence, not always the best option.
The second point is also quite interesting because it illuminates a subtle point that is often ignored. Clients frequently seek out
vendors to gain access to the vendor’s world class IT capabilities (Lacity, 1995). The perception is that having the vendor
manages the client’s IT allows the client to enjoy the same level of capabilities the vendor possesses. However, this is not the
case, as the client’s IT capabilities are precisely those determined by the contract and not by the vendor. That is to say, the
contract fully mediates the vendor’s capabilities. A poorly conceived deal with an excellent vendor does not give the client world
class IT capabilities.
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These results imply a very significant suggestion for practice. Rather than focus on current IT needs or some target bundle of
services, clients and vendors should consider a range of possible outcomes. Specifically, we recommend that IT outsourcing
negotiations should develop several scenarios and compare the internal costs to the contractually specified costs for a variety of
situations. Considering several such scenarios will give clients a better feel for the contract’s flexibility and give the vendor an
additional selling point.
This work investigates the interplay between baseline cost and flexibility. We realize that including factors other than quantity
such as quality, trust and nature of relationship will make the model more applicable to the real world. Future research can look
at including these factors in the model. Future research can also look at the issue as to why the clients go for less flexible contracts
as well as the effects of lack of flexibility of the contract.
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Appendix 1
From eqn (5) we have
1
 b − bv   m c − m v  
~
~
E (π c ) = E (π v ) = ∫  c
 q  qdq
+
2  
2
 
0 

(5)

Now for a general case where the contractually specified baseline cost is b p and slope of the cost curve is m p .
1

E (π c ) =

∫ [(b

c

]

(a1)

]

(a2)

− b p ) + (mc − m p )q qdq

0

Similarly
1

[

E (π p ) = ∫ (b p − bv ) + (m p − mv )q qdq
0

From eqn (6) and (7) we get the client and vendor constraints

E (π c ) ≥ E (π~c )

(6)

E (π v ) ≥ E (π~v )

(7)

Putting (a1) and (5) in eqn (6)
1

∫ [(b

c

]

− b p ) + (mc − m p )q qdq

$

 bc − bv
∫0  2

$

 bc − bv

 2

1

0

2
3
(bc − b p ) q + (mc − m p ) q
2
3

(b

c

1

0

1
1


− b p ) − 0  + (m c − m p ) − 0 
2
3



bc b p m c m p
−
+
−
2
2
3
3
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$

  mc − mv
+
2
 

 
 q  qdq
 

 q 2  mc − mv
+

2
 2 

 q3

 3

1

(a4)
0

 bc − bv   1
  m − m v  1

 − 0  +  c
 − 0 

2
 

 3
 2  2
$

bc bv m c m v
− +
−
4
4
6
6

(a3)

(a5)

(a6)

b p m c bc bv m c m v 
b
m p $ 3 c −
+
− + −
+

2
3
4
4
6
6 
2

(a7)

 b

1
1
m p $ 3 − p + (bc + bv ) + (m v + mc )
6
 2 4


(a8)
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Putting eqn (a2) and (7) in eqn (5)
1

∫ [(b

p

]

− bv ) + (m p − mv )q qdq

0

2
3
(b p − bv ) q + (m p − mv ) q
2
3

(b

p

1

$
0

1

1

− bv ) − 0  + (m p − mv ) − 0 
2

3

bp
2

−

 bc − bv
2
0
1

$

bv m p m v
+
−
2
3
3

$

∫ 

  mc − mv
+
2
 

 
 q  qdq
 

 bc − bv  q 2  m c − m v  q 3
+



2
 2  2 
 3
 bc − bv

 2
$

 1
  m − mv
 − 0  +  c
2
 
 2

(a9)

1

(a10)
0

 1

 − 0 

 3

bc bv m c m v
− +
−
4
4
6
6

(a11)

(a12)

b p mv bc bv mc mv 
b
m p $ 3 v −
+
+ − +
−

2
3
4
4
6
6 
2

(a13)

 b

1
1
m p $ 3 − p + (bv + bc ) + (m c + mv )
6
 2 4


(a14)

 b

1
1
m p = 3 − p + (bv + bc ) + (mc + mv )
6
 2 4


(8)

Solving (a8) and (a14)
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